Hayreddin Barbarossa, the famed admiral of the Ottoman Empire, effectively became the master of the Mediterranean during the first half of the 16th century. Between 1543 and 1544, he raided numerous towns along the Spanish coast as well as the Genoese coast. This was nothing new, as he had been doing so for years; what was truly curious this time was that he used the French port of Toulon as his base, ceded to him by King Francis I after signing an alliance with Suleiman the Magnificent, having the Habsburgs as their common enemy.
We will not delve into Barbarossa’s curriculum vitae here but instead focus on this episode, which originated from Charles V’s dual failure: first, in trying to hire him—since he could not overcome him—and second, in his failed attack on Algiers in 1541. This defeat left the sea in enemy hands, as the emperor once again faced issues with France after the Truce of Nice in 1538, which had ended ten years of war and was supposed to last another decade.
Francis I acted because he recognized Spain’s economic and military exhaustion, taking advantage of a Protestant uprising in Germany to ignite a new conflict in 1542.
Meanwhile, Suleiman had provided Barbarossa with a formidable fleet of more than 200 ships—half of them galleys—with the goal of attacking the western coast of the Italian Peninsula. This was a territory under perpetual dispute between Francis I, who insisted on his dynastic rights over the Duchy of Milan, and Charles V, who demanded his renunciation as stipulated in the Treaty of Madrid (the French king had signed it while in Spain after being captured in the Battle of Pavia, but upon regaining his freedom, he claimed he had done so under duress). Their disputes were not limited to Italy, as Charles claimed the Duchy of Burgundy, while his adversary sought Naples and Flanders.
In sum, both sought supremacy in Europe, and an attempt to resolve the matter proposed by the emperor in 1540—marrying his daughter Maria of Austria to the French king’s son, Charles of Valois, who would inherit the contested territories in exchange for France relinquishing Milan—was met with a counteroffer from Francis: he would agree if the other surrendered his Flemish possessions. No agreement was reached, and thus everything was destined for war.
Francis I tried to win over the Schmalkaldic League (formed by Protestant princes) but failed, as the league sided with the emperor in 1542 after he convinced them that the common danger was the infidel. Left with no other option, Francis turned to his old ally from 1538: the Turks.
He believed he could do so because Charles’s failed campaign in Algiers had concluded, and it was no longer necessary to remain on the sidelines, as ethics had previously dictated when a Christian monarch was fighting infidels.
Charles responded by allying with Henry VIII in 1543. However, this support was of limited significance because England at the time did not have a large enough population to contribute substantial military contingents and, above all, still lacked a navy on par with the times (Henry’s father had initiated a shipbuilding program that would not yield significant results until the reign of Elizabeth I).
Nevertheless, it was a reinforcement that emboldened the Habsburg emperor to accept the declaration of war from his rival, who justified it by citing the killing of his ambassador to Constantinople near Pavia by imperial troops. Charles’s apologies were of no avail because, in Francis I’s view, it was an offense so great, so detestable, and so unusual among those who hold the title and quality of prince, that it can in no way be forgiven or endured.
The Spanish and French clashed on Italian soil, with fortune favoring the former to the extent that, by the end of the year, they were preparing to invade France from one side while an English contingent advanced from another. Desperate, Francis opened the gates of Toulon to Barbarossa, whose fleet had departed from the Sea of Marmara in May 1543, raiding Sicily and southern Italy along the way, even threatening Rome itself from the mouth of the Tiber on June 29 (French ambassador Antoine Escalin des Aimars, also known as Captain Polin, intervened to prevent it).
On August 6, 110 Ottoman galleys were joined by around fifty French ones to besiege Nice, which at the time was governed by Charles III, Duke of Savoy, and an ally of the Habsburgs. The city surrendered—except for the fortress—and initially, looting was restrained.
However, news of the arrival of Genoese Andrea Doria—the Christian gendarme of the Mediterranean—leading a relief army, combined with the disappointing performance of the French galleys, according to Barbarossa, prompted him to withdraw. Before leaving, he took 5,000 captives as slaves and set the city ablaze.
He then established himself in Toulon, securing a perfect base from which to operate in the Ligurian Sea and harass cities under the control of the Republic of Genoa, a Habsburg ally. With nearly 30,000 Ottomans present, the city became, as contemporaries described, a second Constantinople; even the cathedral was used as a mosque, and the official currency became the altun minted by Mehmed II.
Given these circumstances, one might have expected conflicts with the local population, which was Christian after all, but none arose because the French king ordered his governor to evacuate all inhabitants under threat of death, allowing only heads of households to remain to sustain the economy.
As compensation for the inconvenience, the locals were exempted for ten years from paying the taille, a direct tax that had originally been exceptional but became permanent in 1439 to fund the Hundred Years’ War and was levied based on the amount of land each household owned.
During the winter of 1543-44, Barbarossa’s fleet spread terror. His right-hand man, Admiral Salah Rais, attacked Barcelona, San Remo, Monaco, Borghetto Santo Spirito, and Ceriale, among other notable towns. Later, due to bad weather, the campaign continued with a series of quick raids along the Spanish Levant.
Barbarossa himself sailed to Genoa to negotiate the release of Turgut Reis, a corsair and admiral better known as Dragut, who had been captured in 1540 by Andrea Doria’s nephew, Giannettino, at the Battle of Girolata. Barbarossa held Dragut in such high regard that he paid 3,000 gold ducats for his release (interestingly, in 1546, Dragut would again use Toulon as a refuge from the Genoese).
Otherwise, Barbarossa was comfortable in the French city because the host country provided provisions, with estimates of 10 million kilograms of bread supplied during his stay. This displeased the local governor, who complained that their ally had become too reliant on France’s coffers.
Francis I had also promised support if Barbarossa dared to reconquer Tunis, but the king faced intense pressure from other Christian states, outraged by his collaboration with Muslims against fellow Christians. As a result, his support was limited, disappointing the Ottomans and straining their alliance.
Ultimately, after eight months, Barbarossa decided to weigh anchor and return to Suleiman, who had just granted him the title of Beyler Bey (commander of commanders). He left Toulon on May 24, dissatisfied despite being compensated by the French with 800,000 crowns and the release of all Ottoman galley slaves.
Before departing, he resupplied by looting several French ships anchored in the port. Even so, the aforementioned Captain Polin accompanied him with his galleys to present himself as a new ambassador to Suleiman. Along the way, they raided more Italian cities, including Porto Ercole, Giglio, Talamone, and Lipari, capturing another 6,000 slaves.
In reality, a strategic shift occurred among all parties, who were exhausted. Charles V and the Sultan signed a truce, prompting Francis to agree to his own on September 18, 1544. This was the Peace of Crépy, which established a status quo, though it didn’t last long. The French forced the English to retreat from their territory, but Henry VIII held onto Boulogne-sur-Mer, refusing to return it unless Francis ceased supporting the Scottish rebels. Charles V’s mediation failed. The French response was an attempted invasion of England, which ended in failure, leading to the Treaty of Ardres in June 1546: Henry returned Boulogne for two million écus.
By then, Barbarossa had retired and died that same year, giving the Ottomans a temporary respite from the emperor to focus on their own issues with the Protestants. These were resolved decisively—but temporarily—in 1547 with their brilliant victory at Mühlberg. That year also saw the death of Francis I, who thus avoided fulfilling one of Crépy’s clauses: in yet another of his capricious shifts, he had committed to providing 10,000 soldiers to fight the infidel.
This article was first published on our Spanish Edition on September 20, 2019: Cuando Francia evacuó Toulon y convirtió la catedral en mezquita para cedérsela temporalmente a los otomanos
SOURCES
Roger Crowley, Empires of the sea. The Siege of Malta, the Battle of Lepanto, and the contest for the center of the world
Eladio Romero García e Iván Romero Catalán, Breve historia del Imperio Otomano
VVAA, El Imperio Otomano en la Europa renacentista
Stanley Lane-Poole, Los corsarios berberiscos
Robert J. Knecht, Renaissance warrior and patron. The reign of Francis I
Henry Kamen, Carlos emperador. Vida del rey césar
Wikipedia, Ottoman wintering in Toulon
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