In the year 869 AD, the Great Heathen Army of Danish Viking Ivar the Boneless was conquering the English kingdom of East Anglia, an earthquake followed by a tsunami ravaged the northwest of Japan, Stela 11 was erected in Tikal, and the Byzantine fleet under Emperor Basil I was struggling to expel the Muslims from the Adriatic. Meanwhile, the Abbasid Caliphate faced an unexpected and serious problem: a massive insurrection that broke out in Mesopotamia near Basra, led by a self-proclaimed descendant of Muhammad who was joined by thousands of slaves. The suppression of this revolt diverted so many troops that Egypt seized the opportunity to gain de facto independence for nearly four decades. This was the Zanj Rebellion.
Leaving aside the debated hypothesis by some experts regarding its possible Chinese origin, zanj is an Arabic word meaning “land of the blacks,” used by medieval Muslim geographers to refer both to the Swahili coast (Southeast Africa) and its Bantu inhabitants. This term gave rise to the name Zanzibar and the Latinized Zingium, which referred to the coast of Kenya and Tanzania, where the Islamic world obtained ivory, gold, and, above all, slaves. Consequently, these individuals also came to be known as zanj, as they were gathered at factories established in the area, like Malindi, Mombasa, Gedi, Pemba, and so on.
Contrary to popular belief, African slavery did not reach its peak with European slave traders but rather with Arabs, who over several centuries hunted or purchased millions of black people to transport them to the Middle East, Indian Ocean islands, and the Indian subcontinent. This trade was not new, as it had existed since antiquity, described by authors such as Strabo, Pliny the Elder, and Agatharchides of Cnidus. Muslims simply took over from Egyptians, Babylonians, Greeks, Persians, Indians, and Byzantines, especially from the 9th century onward.
Specifically, Arab traders settled in the region, attracted by the wealth they could obtain. Just as the Portuguese would later do on the other side of the continent, they initially organized their own slave raids and, after exhausting the most accessible areas, switched to purchasing the “merchandise” from indigenous tribal chiefs, transporting them across savannas and jungles to the coast for shipment. It is impossible to know exactly how many people suffered this sad fate, but the French historian Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau estimates around six thousand per year, which would mean approximately seventeen million from the 7th century to 1920. Others lower the figure, assuming the native population did not exceed forty million.
Most of the slaves were of Bantu ethnicity. The Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs bought them to train as soldiers, though their loyalty was questionable; this was proven in 696, when Zanj troops rebelled in what is now Iraq. But their military use was limited compared to agricultural purposes. As the economy improved and Arabs prospered to the point of becoming wealthy, they tended to disdain manual labor as unworthy of their social status. Furthermore, there was a plan to reclaim the delta of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (in the Iranian province of Khuzestan), abandoned due to peasant migration and persistent flooding, to turn it into sugarcane plantations, which required a large labor force.
Thousands of slaves were tasked with clearing the salt-encrusted soil in the Khuzestan regions (in present-day Iran) to make it arable. This was an inescapable issue, as landowners received their lands on the condition of putting them to use, so they sent many zanj there from Sawad, as southern Iraq was then called. The slaves not only worked the fertile irrigated plains (which generated more tax revenue than Egypt and the Syrian-Palestinian strip) but also the salt mines around Basra. Both were arduous jobs that led to uprisings—failed—in 689 and 694.
Starting in 861, the Abbasid caliphate went through one of the typical conflicts that accompanied each change of caliph: the period known as the anarchy of Samarra, during which there was a serious succession crisis with six puppet caliphs dominated by rival military factions. Samarra, the capital of the caliphate at that time, was the scene of the assassination of al-Mutawakkil, followed by the poisoning of al-Muntasir within six months, the flight and subsequent execution of al-Musta’in, the overthrow of the usurper al-Mu’tazz, and the violent death of al-Muhtadi. The enthronement of al-Mu’tamid in 870 ended the instability.
During this turbulent period, the caliphate experienced three dramatic events: an outright civil war, sometimes called the Fifth Fitna, between al-Musta’in and al-Musta’zz from 865 to 866; the Kharijite Revolt (the Kharijites were a fanatical religious sect opposed to the government) in Upper Mesopotamia from 866 to 896; and the Zanj Rebellion, which arose not only from the slaves’ desire for freedom or the chaotic situation but also from the rise of Shi’ism, a branch of Islam that opposed the Sunni Abbasids by arguing that Ali Ibn Abi Talib should have been Muhammad’s heir—by virtue of being married to his daughter Fatima—instead of Abu Bakr as-Siddiq.
As often happens in such cases, a spiritual leader was needed to channel the discontent, and he was found in the figure of Ali ibn Muhammad. He is an obscure character with few reliable data available. Some claim he had a slave origin (Sindhi, from Pakistan), while others consider him a descendant of ancient Arab tribes or even make him Persian; he claimed that Ali, the aforementioned son-in-law of Muhammad, was his ancestor, though contemporary Muslim historians rejected this claim. In any case, he lived for a time in Samarra, where he had contact with influential slaves of Caliph al-Muntasir, then went to Bahrain, where he converted to Shi’ism and began inciting rebellion against the caliphate.
He gained considerable popularity due to discontent over the abusive jarach (a land tax initially imposed only on non-Muslims, like the jizya, but extended to everyone from the eighth century onward). Despite this, his movement failed, and he had to flee to Basra in 868. There, he attempted to channel the power struggle between two rival factions to his advantage, but this also didn’t work out, forcing him to flee once more and take refuge in the Mesopotamian marshes. He was eventually captured and sent to Wasit. After his release, he spent a year in Baghdad, where he once again gained followers by aligning himself with Zaydism.
Zaydism is a branch of Shi’ism that emerged in that century, recognizing the same first four caliphs as the Shi’ites but not the fifth, Muhammad al-Baqir, replacing him instead with Zayd ibn Ali. They believe that the imams are not divinely guided and thus are not infallible, making Zaydists the Shi’ites closest to Sunnism. Ali ibn Muhammad then learned of new unrest in Basra and decided to return in hopes of leveraging it. He succeeded by studying the deplorable living conditions of the slaves and promising them freedom and prosperity if they supported him. Initially, he didn’t attract many followers and earned the derogatory nickname Sahib al-Zanj (“Chief of the Zanj”).
However, he unexpectedly gained support from other social groups, including servants, freedmen, small artisans, modest workers, farmers, and, notably, Bedouins settled around the city. To better align with the mentality of these groups, he preached Kharijism, an ideology centered on egalitarianism and the belief that the community should elect the caliph; no candidate should be excluded, not even the Zanj. Moreover, since the Kharijites consider it legitimate to overthrow anyone who does not act righteously—because it removes them from the law—they were prepared to take up arms against the aristocratic privileges, initially of the Quraysh, later the Umayyads, and now the Abbasids.
Ali ibn Muhammad, skillfully combining Kharijism with Zaydism, began his Friday sermons by exclaiming, “God is great, God is great, there is no god but God, and God is great; there is no justice but God’s justice!”—the war cry of Ali’s supporters at the Battle of Siffin (657). Once he gathered enough people, he called for rebellion, which started in Basra but soon spread. Leveraging his knowledge of the marshes, the rebels engaged in a guerrilla war that the caliphal army was unable to contain.
As can be inferred, the Zanj Rebellion was not solely a slave uprising but a much more diverse socio-religious movement of the humbler classes and Bedouins, including even military forces, to which the Zanj joined later. Why, then, has it been characterized as an anti-slavery revolt? Because the main source used by contemporary Orientalists is History of the Prophets and Kings, written by the Persian Al-Tabari, an imam and chronicler contemporary to these events, who portrayed it as such. Today, Muslim historiography considers that the Zanj were not even the majority, with free Arabs and Africans making up the bulk.
The first attacks consisted of night raids on cities like al-Ubulla and Shuq al-Ahwaz, which provided them with arms, food, and horses, while also increasing their forces by liberating slaves. Later, they targeted the dikes, flooding the fields and thereby impacting the Caliphate’s economy. Eventually, after gaining control of the surroundings, they even built fortresses defended by canals, from which they launched naval raids with boats. This way, they blockaded Basra, their primary target, cutting off its supplies and causing a dire famine in which the inhabitants were forced to consume their domestic animals and even resort to cannibalism.
As noted earlier, the city fell in 871 and was devastated, with the men exterminated and the women ironically reduced to slavery. The regent Abu Ahmad Ṭalḥa, better known by his nickname al-Muwaffaq Billah (“Blessed by God”), brother of the caliph al-Mutamid, organized a counterattack in 872. However, he lacked sufficient forces as the bulk of the army was fighting the Saffarids, followers of Ya’qub ibn al-Layth, or al-Saffar, a mere soldier who had taken advantage of the political instability to seize control of the eastern part of the caliphate and establish his own dynasty (the Saffarid) at the expense of the Tahirids. Al-Saffar would eventually make a pact with the Abbasids against the Zanj, whose egalitarian ideology alarmed him, and in return, he was recognized as governor by the caliph.
But, for the moment, al-Muwaffaq failed, and the Zanj not only solidified their control in the east but also began a march advancing parallel to the course of the Tigris, supported by the Bedouins they encountered, taking control of other cities such as Wasit, Kaskar, and Ramhurmuz, with Baghdad as their new objective. The peak of their power came in 879, when they founded their own capital, Moktara (“The Chosen City”). However, that year also marked the death of al-Saffar, and although his brother Amr ibn al-Layth succeeded him, he simultaneously had to recognize the caliph’s authority as some Tahirids returned intent on reclaiming their territory. This allowed the caliphate to redirect forces against the Zanj.
Al-Muwaffaq handed command of the troops to his son Abū al-ʿAbbās, the future Caliph al-Mu’tadid, and later joined him to launch an offensive that gradually expelled the rebels from the captured areas, driving them toward Moktara and causing internal divisions: domestic slaves against eunuchs, Blacks against Turks… The brutality with which the Zanj leaders were executed, along with their own excesses with the subjugated populations—whom they treated just as their previous masters had, thus breaking their egalitarian ideal—caused the revolt to lose both sympathizers and territory until their army was besieged in Moktara in 881.
The siege lasted over two years, during which time al-Muwaffaq, with military assistance from another of his sons, Harun, offered generous terms to those who surrendered, prompting many to desert and turn themselves in. The city finally fell in 883, and Ali ibn Mohammed was executed along with most of his commanders; the rest surrendered or perished in combat, except for a thousand who died of thirst and exhaustion while attempting to escape across the desert, and a small group that resorted to desperate looting for a time before being annihilated. As a reward, al-Muwaffaq was granted the title al-Nasir li-Din Allah (“The Defender of God’s Faith”).
The end of the Zanj had an epilogue. In 871, Ahmad ibn Tulun, the son of a Turkish slave and governor of Egypt, took advantage of the rebellion to expel the caliphal delegate and cease paying the heavy taxes, with which he created an army of ghilman (slave soldiers taken as prisoners following jihadist wars in conquered regions or in border areas of Muslim states), breaking his vassalage to al-Muwaffaq, expanding his borders to Syria and Cilicia, and becoming de facto independent, although he officially maintained loyalty to the caliph. The Tulunid dynasty would resist until 905, when the Abbasids regained control.
The Zanj Rebellion left a deep impression at the time due to its social component; so much so that contemporary Muslim historians gave highly exaggerated estimates of casualties in the conflict (half a million, according to al-Masudi, nicknamed the Herodotus of the Arabs; three times as many according to the scholar al-Suli; and Ibn al-Taqtaqi went as far as two and a half million). Politically, as we’ve seen, the Egyptians and Saffarids took advantage of the chaos, as did the Byzantines by reclaiming their eastern provinces. Additionally, the economy was nearly destroyed by war and neglect, along with many cities, leading some scholars to suggest that the region never fully recovered.
In contrast, to prevent new uprisings, the Muslims of Basra freed many Zanj and replaced them with serfs. They also softened the system of slavery, which took on different characteristics and provided an opportunity for social advancement based on individual capacity, setting aside the racial prejudices that had previously existed.
This article was first published on our Spanish Edition on November 6, 2024: La Rebelión Zanj, cuando esclavos y beduinos se alzaron contra el Califato Abásida
SOURCES
Ehsan Yar-Shater (ed.), The History of Al-Tabari. The Revolt of the Zanj
Henry Moa, The Revolt of the Zanj
Hala Mundhir Fattah y Frank Caso, A brief history of Iraq
Bacheh Shoureshi, Zapping the Zanj: Towards a History of the Zanj Slaves’ Rebellion
Wikipedia, Rebelión Zanj
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