The last human sacrifices carried out in Rome—beyond considering the ludi gladiatorii as an acceptable adaptation of the concept—took place in 216 BC. It was during a colossal catastrophe that shook Rome to the point of desperately reviving those ancient practices. The same disaster that caused tens of thousands of deaths, the loss of many military leaders, and even a quarter of the senators; the one that left the city nearly at Hannibal’s mercy, the worst enemy it had ever faced. The defeat at the Battle of Cannae.

This battle was part of the Second Punic War, which had begun two years earlier as Rome and Carthage vied for control of the western Mediterranean. Shortly after it started, Hannibal Barca gathered an army in Hispania, crossed the Pyrenees and the Alps, and broke into the Italian Peninsula, defeating the Romans in three battles: the battles of the Ticinus River, the Trebia River, and Lake Trasimene. The situation became so concerning for the locals that, as was customary in such cases, they decided to appoint a dictator with full powers, choosing Quintus Fabius Maximus.

The first thing he did was try to boost morale through a grand religious ceremony that included the sacrifice of animals and humans (it is said that in this holocaust, even a hundred children born during the votive period were sacrificed, without sparing even those of patrician origin, although another interpretation holds that they did not die but were selected to later, upon reaching twenty years old, undertake a pilgrimage while veiled). They also revived the Etruscan tradition of sprinkling human blood on the soil of Rome’s founders, preserved in a sanctuary called Mundus.

Second Punic War
Hannibal’s victories in Italy. Credit: Popadius / Rowanwindwhistler / Wikimedia Commons

After achieving the goal of boosting spirits, the hardest part arrived. Fabius was a veteran soldier; he had served as consul due to his victory over the Ligurians—he was even awarded a triumph—and had been part of the delegation sent to Carthage to declare war for their occupation of the Spanish city of Saguntum. Now he faced the challenge of confronting a superior adversary, without the full cooperation of his magister militum, Marcus Minucius Rufus, who was a political rival, nor of troops with experience, since they had been hastily recruited. He needed time to train them properly.

Therefore, he decided to apply a defensive strategy, avoiding open-field battles and limiting himself to harassing the enemy through ambushes and attrition tactics that have gone down in history as the Fabian strategy. This earned him the disparaging nickname of Cunctator (“the delayer”), as the Romans expected more initiative and greater forcefulness. When Minucius, disobeying his orders, managed to drive off a Carthaginian contingent pillaging the fields for supplies, popular dissatisfaction only increased. Later, he fell into an ambush, and Fabius had to come to his rescue, but ultimately the Senate decided not to renew the dictator’s powers.

Instead, they handed the consulship to Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus, who were succeeded by Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus in 216 BC. There was a complete change in strategy. Fearing that this delay might allow Hannibal to win over the Italic peoples to his side, they decided to try to end the war as quickly as possible, which inevitably involved defeating him in a pitched battle. Thus, with a view to securing victory, they assembled the largest army to date: eight legions, according to Polybius, which, together with cavalry and allies, totaled ninety thousand men.

Quintus Fabius Maximus
Quintus Fabius Maximus before the Senate of Carthage, a work by Tiepolo. Credit: Public domain / Wikimedia Commons

The consuls were to alternate command each day, which posed a problem because of their differing characters: Varro, reckless and arrogant, was eager to engage the enemy as soon as possible; Paullus, more cautious, was reluctant to fight openly, aware of the superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry (it should be noted that these portrayals come mainly from Polybius, who served the grandson of the latter, none other than Scipio Aemilianus, and, along with Livy, made every effort to highlight the lowly origins of the former, whom they saw as merely the son of a butcher who rose through his support of the popular cause).

The capture of the village of Cannae by Hannibal, which secured an important food reserve—a necessary gain, as rumors spread that the Iberians in his army, suffering from shortages, were planning to desert—while also depriving Rome of this supply, along with the threat of losing all of Apulia, accelerated the events. The consuls marched toward that southern region, and two days later they caught up with the Carthaginians at the River Aufidus (modern Ofanto), camping about fifty stades away (a little over nine kilometers) after repelling a minor attack that, however, gave Varro an overly optimistic view of the situation.

And this was despite not knowing that one of the Carthaginian generals, Gisgo, had been ridiculed by Hannibal when he expressed surprise at the large Roman forces. But Barca was aware that his commanders had to take turns in command, and he intended to exploit this, provoking Varro, the less prudent of the two, into a confrontation: at night, he feigned leaving his camp to lure the legionaries out to plunder it, but Paullus sent scouts who detected the trap. The next day, he also refused to emerge, even as the enemy deployed to provoke him. Thus, for two days, both armies remained in anticipation.

The Romans built two camps, one on each side of the river, to facilitate supply operations to the main camp and hinder those of the enemy. However, it was the enemy who managed to block the legions’ access to water supplies by creating chaos with their cavalry in these camps. It is said that they even contaminated the precious water by throwing corpses into it, though Polybius does not mention this. Despite everything, Paulus managed to curb his men’s urge to fight, though dehydration would play a role in the upcoming battle, which was inevitable, as the next day, Varro would be in command, and, as we saw, he was indeed ready for combat.

Hannibal
Bust of Hannibal Barca found at Capua. Credit: Fratelli Alinari / Public domain / Wikimedia Commons

Appian and Livy add that Hannibal also sent around five hundred mercenaries—Celtiberians, according to the former, or Numidians, according to the latter—who pretended to surrender, handing over their long weapons but keeping their short ones to use when the now-imminent battle began (it is worth noting here that Hannibal’s troops were composed of Carthaginians, Numidians, Libyans, Phoenicians, Gaetulians, Italians, Gauls, and Spaniards, totaling around fifty-four thousand warriors). Finally, the time had come. We do not know the exact date of the clash, but it is estimated to have occurred between July and August, perhaps on the 2nd of that latter month.

Varro could no longer hold back and deployed his men with Roman cavalry on the right wing, allied cavalry on the left, and infantry in the center, with the cohorts arranged along a front approximately one and a half kilometers wide, and a greater-than-usual depth—about one hundred meters—to quickly break through the Carthaginian center, as had happened at Trebia. Despite everything, the formation remained conventional, with light troops in front and heavy ones behind, all set to press against the enemy, who appeared to have made the mistake of positioning themselves with the river behind them, which would cut off their retreat. However, it produced the opposite effect: the river shielded the Carthaginian army from being surrounded by the superior Roman numbers, leaving the Romans with only the left flank as a possible escape route.

Not only that, but the Carthaginian army ensured that the sun was at their backs, blinding the opponent, who was also bothered by dust stirred up by the southeast wind. The Carthaginians were arranged in two uneven lines, with the Iberians and Celtiberians in the center due to their greater discipline, and the Gauls behind. The front stretched approximately three kilometers if the cavalry was included. The Punic infantry, abandoning hoplitic tactics and armed with light spears—thus enjoying great mobility—were placed on the wings. The heavy Spanish cavalry under Hasdrubal (a general, not Hannibal’s brother) was on the left, and Hannón’s light Numidian cavalry on the right.

Cannae battle
First phase of the battle: initial deployment and Roman attack (in red). Credit: Public domain / Wikimedia Commons

Varro commanded his left flank, Paulus the right, and the ex-consuls Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Minucius Rufus the center. The latter would face Hannibal himself, accompanied by his brother Mago, who began to extend their lines as they advanced, gradually forming a crescent shape whose ends stretched around the Roman flanks. It is unclear if this was planned, arose from the natural tendency to become disordered while advancing, or developed from the course of the battle, in which the Punic center yielded to the enemy’s push, allowing those ends to stretch out. The Roman cavalry could not prevent this because it was overwhelmed by the Spanish, though the cavalry on both sides often fought dismounted due to the difficulties in maneuvering and controlling the horses. Then, it was the infantry’s turn.

After the usual exchange of projectiles—javelins, arrows, stones from slingers, etc.—they engaged in close combat, where the Roman superiority initially appeared to dominate. Hannibal ordered a gradual retreat, allowing the cohorts to wedge themselves into his formation. However, the area occupied by the Carthaginians was smaller due to their numerical inferiority, which caused the legionaries to bunch together, packed so tightly they had barely any room to wield their weapons, becoming disordered. When the Romans realized this, the African troops on the ends of the semicircle, who had remained on standby until then, had surrounded them and now attacked transversely while the cavalry did the same from the rear.

Suddenly, the Roman advance halted, immobilized by such a lack of space that the soldiers could not even raise their shields to defend themselves. The Iberians took advantage of this vulnerability, attacking them with their falcatas—it is said that the Romans, impressed by its effectiveness, would later model their gladius on this weapon—and then they were joined by the Punic soldiers, well-protected with armor seized from enemies fallen in previous battles, already battle-hardened compared to the many inexperienced Romans. The Gauls and Iberians in the center had suffered heavy losses—around five thousand—serving as bait, but now the roles were reversed, and it was their turn to slaughter the others.

Cannae battle
Second phase of the battle: encirclement and Roman defeat. Credit: Public domain / Wikimedia Commons

Polybius recounts that the Romans lost leaders and standards, with survivors regrouping in scattered units that were ultimately annihilated. The massacre lasted six hours, and according to Livy, the Carthaginians ended up exhausted from killing; historian Robert Cowley estimates that at some moments, around six hundred legionaries died every minute. Seven thousand retreated to the smaller camp, ten thousand to the larger, and about two thousand to Cannae itself. The first group managed to join forces and, despite being nearly disarmed, fled to the nearby town of Canusium (today Canosa di Puglia), while those at Cannae were surrounded by cavalry under Carthaginian commander Cartalon.

Among the survivors were Varro, who managed to reach Venusia (modern Venosa) with seventy horsemen, and Scipio Africanus, who escaped with five hundred of his men. Not so lucky were Regulus, Geminus, and Rufus, who fell in combat alongside around eighty senators (a quarter of the total), two quaestors, and twenty-nine tribunes. In his work Punica, Silius Italicus recounts that during his flight, an officer named Lentulus found Consul Paulus seated on a rock, wounded, and offered him his horse. Paulus refused, urging him to go to Rome to sound the alarm and inform Fabius Maximus that he had tried to follow his strategy. The Carthaginians killed him shortly afterward, though Hannibal honored his body with a funeral tribute.

Another image given by some sources, as vivid as it is harrowing, is of the countless groans and cries of pain uttered by the wounded during the night, lying hopelessly on the battlefield among their fallen comrades. Another striking account describes a Carthaginian soldier, rescued still alive but covered in blood and bruises, who was still being clung to by his Roman adversary. This Roman, before dying, had bitten off parts of the Carthaginian’s face and ears, having lost his weapons.

Cannae battle
Nineteenth-century engraving by German artist Heinrich Leutemann, showing Hannibal surveying the battlefield of Cannae after his victory. Credit: Public Domain / Wikimedia Commons

At Cannae, Rome suffered more casualties than ever, with only Arausio and, in percentage terms, Teutoburg exceeding it. Livy estimates Hannibal’s losses between six and eight thousand, while Polybius places it at five thousand seven hundred; they do agree that most were Gauls and Iberians, those who fought in the center of the formation. These numbers make Cannae the second most deadly battle up to that point, only behind Plataea (although the figures for Plataea, as recorded by Herodotus, are considered exaggerated today) and one of the top fifty deadliest battles in history. After all, a fifth of Rome’s adult population had perished fighting Hannibal over the previous twenty months.

When the fateful news reached Rome, a day of mourning was declared, as everyone knew someone who had fallen. Public events were suspended, women were forbidden to leave their homes, and street vendors were punished as they were considered suspicious. As mentioned earlier, human sacrifices were once again performed, with two Greeks and a mixed Celtic couple buried alive in the Forum Boarium and a deformed infant abandoned in the Adriatic Sea. The sacrificia aliquot extraordinaria (extraordinary sacrifices) were revived in especially difficult times, such as during defeats by Hannibal or the war with the Insubres in 228 BC.

Morale was so low that a military tribune named Lucius Caecilius Metellus considered the war lost and encouraged three of his colleagues to go abroad as mercenaries; Publius Cornelius Scipio prevented this by forcing them to swear loyalty to Rome, sword in hand, upon learning of their intent. This was the same Scipio who would later earn the cognomen Africanus after besieging Carthage; among his troops were two legions formed from the survivors of Cannae, who, despised as cowards, had initially been assigned to Marcus Claudius Marcellus to contain uprisings in Campania and Sicily. For, in the face of such adversity, much of southern Italy sided with the Carthaginians, and even Philip V of Macedon joined them.

Cannae battle
Monument erected at the battlefield of Cannae. Credit: Jörg Schulz / Wikimedia Commons

A symbol of Hannibal’s strong position was the mission he entrusted to Mago: to deliver to the Carthaginian Senate, as special spoils of war, two hundred golden rings taken from fallen equites. Many expected that the next gift would be Rome itself, and in fact, Maharbal (commander of the Numidian cavalry) urged Hannibal to march on the city to enjoy “the victor’s feast on the Capitoline” within five days. But Hannibal declined the suggestion, leading to Maharbal’s famous lament as recorded by Livy: “Evidently, the gods have not granted all virtues to one person: you know how to win, Hannibal, but you do not know how to use victory.”

Hannibal’s refusal has been widely debated among the public; however, historians explain that his army had suffered many dead and wounded, and he also lacked siege equipment and the manpower to attack the city while holding the territory he had captured. Rome still had legions in Sicily, Sardinia, and Hispania. Besieging Rome without a guarantee of success would have risked the psychological impact his victories had achieved over his enemy. Moreover, it is likely that Hannibal never intended to conquer the city but rather to weaken Rome’s will to continue the war by demoralizing it; hence, he followed up his victories with massacres.

Consequently, he sent an embassy led by Carthalon to the Roman Senate to offer negotiations. The senators not only rejected any agreement but also banned the word “peace” from being spoken, limited the mourning period to thirty days, and forbade men from weeping, mobilizing all citizens, landless peasants, and even slaves. The Second Punic War thus continued, and Roman generals learned their lesson, acknowledging the wisdom of Quintus Fabius Maximus’s delaying tactics and avoiding further large-scale battles. Hannibal ended up wandering Italy without clear objectives and ultimately withdrew to Crotona, from where he would later sail to Africa to fight his last battle at Zama.

This article was first published on our Spanish Edition on November 4, 2024: Cannas, la catastrófica derrota que dejó a Roma indefensa ante Aníbal

SOURCES

Tito Livio, Historia de Roma desde su fundación

Polibio, Historias

Plutarco, Vidas paralelas: Fabio Máximo

Silio Itálico, La Guerra Púnica

Apiano, Historia romana

Pedro López Barja de Quiroga, Francisco Javier Lomas Salmonte, Historia de Roma

Adrian Goldsworthy, La caída de Cartago. Las Guerras Púnicas, 265-146 a.C.

Sergei I. Kovaliov, Historia de Roma

Gregory Daily, Cannae. The experience of battle in the Second Punic War

Wikipedia, Batalla de Cannas

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