The name Marcus Valerius Laevinus doesn’t mean much to most history enthusiasts, not even to those interested in Ancient Rome, as he remains overshadowed by other contemporaries who achieved lasting fame due to their roles in the Second Punic War, such as Hannibal Barca, Scipio Africanus, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, or Quintus Fabius Maximus. But Laevinus also played a significant role in the conflict. Although at first, he was nearly deceived by the Macedonians, who pretended to seek an alliance only to later sign one with Carthage, he ultimately managed to subdue their king Philip V, pacify Sicily, and secure the support of Pergamum.

Marcus Valerius Laevinus was born in Rome between 260 B.C. and 250 B.C. He was a descendant (perhaps a grandson or nephew) of Publius Valerius Laevinus, who had served as consul alongside Tiberius Coruncanius two decades earlier and led the war against Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, with little success (he was defeated at the Battle of Heraclea). Marcus himself was elected consul for the first time in 220 B.C., although the elections were annulled for some reason, perhaps due to a formal defect. Nonetheless, he would achieve the consulship again in 210 B.C.

Before that, in 215 B.C., he served as praetor peregrinorum, the magistrate responsible for conflicts involving foreigners and/or between foreigners and Romans—a position that conferred the right to imperium due to the intense level of Roman commerce in the Mediterranean, which was at its height in fierce competition with Carthage. In fact, it was now more than competition because the war had broken out three years earlier, and since Hannibal brought the conflict to the Italian peninsula, achieving the resounding victory at Cannae, the Senate redirected all civilian magistrates, granting them military commands.

Marcus Valerius Laevinus
The Mediterranean world at the time. Credit: Goran tek-en / Rowanwindwhistler / Wikimedia Commons

This is how Laevinus found himself in charge of the legions recently arrived from Sicily and set off to Apulia with the mission of controlling the Adriatic coastline between Brundisium and Tarentum. For this, he was given a fleet of twenty-five ships. He had set up camp in the city of Luceria (modern-day Lucera) when he received a visit from ambassadors sent by the Antigonid Philip V of Macedonia. Their leader, Xenophanes, requested guides and escorts to go to Rome and present a proposal of alliance to the Senate. Additionally, he asked for information about the positions occupied by Romans and Carthaginians to clarify his offer.

This seemed promising since Hannibal’s unstoppable advance had left many Italian peoples abandoning Rome, leaving it almost alone against the threat. Therefore, Laevinus naively agreed, unaware he was being deceived. After gathering all the requested information, Xenophanes didn’t meet with the senators but with Carthaginian delegates, sealing an alliance previously offered to the Romans “before all the gods of war who witness this oath,” in the words of Polybius. Another author, Titus Livius, explains the terms agreed upon in his work History of Rome from its Foundation:

King Philip V, with the maximum number of ships he could assemble (it was believed he could muster two hundred), was to cross over to Italy, devastate the coasts, and wage war with his own forces by land and sea. When the war was over, all of Italy, including the city of Rome, would belong to the Carthaginians and Hannibal. The entire spoils would be reserved for Hannibal alone. After the complete submission of Italy, the Carthaginians would cross over to Greece and wage war against any kings Philip designated; all the territories of the continent and all islands surrounding Macedonia would belong to Philip and would be part of his kingdom.

Hannibal
Bust of Hannibal Barca found at Capua. Credit: Fratelli Alinari / Public domain / Wikimedia Commons

However, the cunning plan did not go as expected. Laevinus eventually realized the deception and sent his ships to capture the Macedonian and Punic delegates, later informing Rome. This meant the involvement of a new enemy, Macedonia, but for the moment, it was necessary to resolve internal defections, and he himself dealt with them in the autumn, subjugating the Hirpini (a people from central Italy, of Samnite ethnicity but considered distinct, living in the mountainous area wedged between the regions of Samnium, Campania, Lucania, and Apulia) of Vescellium, Vercellium, and Siclinum, who had defected to the Carthaginian side. It was then time to address Macedonia.

Since it was unclear whether they would decide to take up arms against the Romans, the consul Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus sent Laevinus to Brundisium to defend the coast of Salento (southeastern Apulia, which could be described as the “heel of the Italian boot”) from a potential attack. There, he received emissaries from the Greek region of Epirus, who informed him that Philip had conquered their city, Oricus, and was preparing to continue toward Apollonia of Illyria, a Roman sympathizer. The monarch apparently possessed a powerful fleet of around 150 ships that could enable him to cross the Adriatic and land in Italy.

In a show of initiative, it was Laevinus who crossed the sea in the other direction, reconquered the city, sent two thousand men under the command of his assistant Quintus Naevius Crista to expel the Macedonians from Apulia, and launched a surprise attack on Philip’s camp at night; he killed three thousand of his soldiers and routed the rest. He then signed an alliance with the Aetolian League and prepared to winter in Oricum, which he used as a naval base so that his fleet of fifty ships could patrol the shores of Aetolia and Achaea, keeping the Macedonian king at bay. For land operations, he had a legion at his disposal.

This boldness earned him the renewal of his praetorship in 214 BC, which he would repeat three more times in 213, 212, and 211 BC. However, the admiration he inspired went beyond this, and he was elected consul for a second time in a term shared with Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who was in his third term, without even running as a candidate. This was made possible because the first choice, Titus Manlius Torquatus, declined due to being too old and having vision problems. With the resources provided by his new consulship, Laevinus resumed the war against Macedonia.

Attalus
Bust of Attalus I, king of Pergamum. Credit: shakko / Wikimedia Commons

The first thing he did was secure the support of the aforementioned Aetolian League, as well as that of King Attalus I of Pergamon. He then expelled the Macedonians from the islands of Zakynthos and Naxos, as well as from the Acarnanian city of Eniade. He wintered in Corcyra, during which time, acting as triumvir monetalis (one of three officials in charge of minting coins), he issued a series of coins made up of victoriati (tropaión, for the Greeks; silver and worth three-quarters of a denarius) and quinarii (also silver, worth half a denarius).

By the spring of 210 BC, Laevinus besieged Anticyra in Phocis, with help from the Aetolians. When it finally fell, they were required to hand over the spoils to the Romans, as they had previously agreed. Shortly before the siege ended, the general was informed of his appointment as consul; he was to assume office, with Publius Sulpicius Galba Maximus as his replacement in the war. His assumption of the consulship was delayed due to a lengthy illness that prevented him from traveling.

Once he recovered, he landed in Capua, where the Campanians begged him to intercede on their behalf before the Senate. According to Livy, they were Rome’s enemies (there was no other people on earth more hostile to the Roman name), having set fire to the Forum and even suspected of aiding Hannibal when they allowed his officer Hanno to camp on advantageous high ground in their territory, which forced Proconsul Quintus Fulvius Flaccus to launch an assault that, though ultimately victorious, nearly resulted in disaster at one point.

For that reason, once Hannibal left, Fulvius subjected Capua to a relentless siege, forcing its inhabitants to remain confined behind their walls, unable to venture into the fields for food. Laevinus agreed to advocate for them, but the senators believed that the Campanian betrayal demanded an unconditional surrender, as Flaccus insisted. Ultimately, Flaccus’s stance prevailed, and all adult Campanians were executed, with the rest sold into slavery, rendering Laevinus’s oral intervention futile.

Marcus Valerius Laevinus
Campaign of Laevinus in Greece in 210 BC. Credit: Public domain / Wikimedia Commons

In reality, his presentation to the senators focused on the situation in Greece. He believed that the victories against Philip V disqualified him as an immediate threat, allowing for the redeployment of one of the legions stationed there for use against the Carthaginians. Because the Second Punic War was still ongoing and twenty-one legions had already been recruited for it that year. By lot, Consul Marcus Claudius Marcellus was assigned to Sicily and Laevinus to Italy. However, they swapped their respective assignments after the Sicilians complained about enduring another Marcellus, as they were far from pleased with his harshness.

Thus, Laevinus departed for the Italian island, where tensions were high due to the destruction of Syracuse ordered by Marcellus because the local tyrant, Hiero, had sided with Carthage. The Syracusans protested because the popular sentiment was pro-Roman, but Marcellus wanted to set an example, refusing the offer from some citizens to open the gates for him, preferring to take the city by storm, which aroused public indignation. Laevinus’s arrival helped to calm the mood.

But first, he had to address a pressing issue in Rome. After three years of war, the fleet needed funding to replace its losses, so it was proposed that the people fund the salaries and provisions for a new batch of rowers. However, the treasury was empty, and both citizens and allies were already burdened with heavy ad hoc taxes, making it impossible for them to take on more. The controversy threatened to spark widespread discontent, posing a danger; yet, something had to be done for the fleet.

Second Punic War
Hannibal’s victories in Italy. Credit: Popadius / Rowanwindwhistler / Wikimedia Commons

Laevinus then proposed a daring idea: that senators and anyone who had held a magistracy should surrender their assets to the public treasury, except those necessary for basic living, performing sacrifices, paying for children’s amulets, or allowing women minimal adornments. In a great demonstration of Roman virtus, not only did everyone agree without the need to enact any law or edict, but they were then followed by the next social class, the ordo equester, with the equites keeping only their distinctive rings.

This action removed a potential source of discord among the common people, and the fleet was financed, so Laevinus departed in the fall for Sicily. After finalizing agreements with Syracuse, he laid siege to Agrigentum, which was still held by Hanno. Hanno had the support of the Numidian Mutines, who operated freely across the island with such success that the Carthaginian began to distrust him and removed him from command. Resentful, Mutines switched sides and made a pact with the Romans to open the gates of Agrigentum for them. The legions entered the city, massacred its inhabitants, and sold the rest as slaves, as they had in Capua.

Like a house of cards, all the Punic positions fell one after another, whether conquered, surrendered through betrayal, or simply given up. With this brilliant victory that pacified Sicily (nearly four thousand prisoners were taken and offered relocation to southern Italy if they managed to seize land from the pro-Carthaginian Bruttians), and with its economy secured by decree (mandating all to engage in agriculture so they could also send grain to Rome), Laevinus left the praetor Lucius Cincius Alimentus in charge and returned with ten ships to the capital to attend to an emerging issue.

This matter involved the new consular elections for the following year. This responsibility should have fallen to Marcellus, but he was actively pursuing Hannibal, and it was deemed unwise to interrupt him, so the matter was entrusted to Laevinus. The still-consul reported that he had taken sixty-six cities, secured citizenship for the Numidian Mutines from the senators, and explained that he had dispatched the fleet prefect, Marcus Valerius Messalla, to North Africa to operate behind Punic lines, plunder the region, and monitor the enemy.

It was Messalla who reported that Carthage had built a fleet with plans to recapture Sicily, in addition to hiring five thousand Numidians under Masinissa, along with numerous other mercenaries, with the aim of joining Hasdrubal’s forces in Hispania and proceeding to Italy to assist his brother, who had managed to escape Marcellus’s pressure. The situation was so concerning that the Senate decided to send Laevinus back to Sicily and asked him to choose a dictator. He appointed Messalla, but this raised a legal issue, as the designated person for this role had to be in Italy, so the Senate refused.

Hannibal and Marcellus
Illustration from 1910 showing Hannibal before the corpse of Marcellus. Credit: Public domain / Wikimedia Commons

There was no choice but to accept the suggestion of Marcus Lucretius, the tribune of the plebs: to consult the people on whom they wanted as dictator. The chosen individual was Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, whose main merit was leading the siege operations in Capua. They also appointed Publius Licinius Crassus, father of the famous Marcus Licinius Crassus, as magister militum. Both appointments received Marcellus’s approval, allowing Laevinus to depart for Sicily as proconsul for the year 209 B.C. He brought along what remained of the legions of Gaius Terentius Varro and Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus Maximus, defeated at Cannae and Herdonia.

In the island, he combined these troops with those of Lucius Cincius Alimentus, assigning two legions and thirty quinqueremes to the new consul, Quintus Fabius Maximus. The propraetor was to defend eastern Sicily, while Laevinus would oversee the west, with Mutines’ cavalry patrolling the interior to secure the grain supply; production was so abundant that there was a surplus to supply both Rome and the army preparing to attack Tarentum.

The following year, with his proconsulship extended, Laevinus moved to Africa with a hundred ships to raid its coastline, encountering only slight resistance from a Carthaginian squadron, which he defeated, returning to Lilybaeum with ample spoils. In 207 B.C., he repeated the incursion with the same success, reaching the gates of Punic cities like Clupea and Utica and sinking seventeen enemy ships that attempted to intercept him. This was his final mission in Sicily, as in 206 B.C., he returned to Italy with two legions to guard Etruria against the threat of Mago, Hannibal’s other brother.

But he did not remain there long. Rome needed allies, and recalling his celebrated time in Greece, the Senate sent him to the court of Attalus I, King of Pergamon, leading a diplomatic delegation that included Marcus Caecilius Metellus, Servius Sulpicius Galba, Gnaeus Tremelius Flaccus, and Marcus Valerius Falto. The mission’s objective was to confirm Attalus’s support and to bring the Magna Mater (Great Mother) from Pesinunte in Anatolia (modern-day Turkey) to Italy—a Phrygian-origin deity whose cult had taken root in Rome to the point that she was equated with Cybele and given a sanctuary on the Capitol.

Second Punic War
Map of the Second Punic War. Credit: YassineMrabet / Wikimedia Commons

The Romans were very inclined to consult oracles, and Magna Mater was reputed for this, so it was decided to bring over the stone that represented her (likely a meteorite) following instructions from the Sibylline Books—mythological and prophetic texts consulted in times of crisis to know how to act. The goddess arrived at the port of Ostia, where she was received by Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica (the cousin of Africanus) and a group of local matrons. Although the cult of Magna Mater did not reach its peak until the time of Emperor Claudius, this was a first step in Rome’s openness to Eastern rites, long before what would later happen with Mithras.

After completing the mission, Levinus returned in 204 BCE. The first thing he did was to present a motion for reimbursing members of the senatorial and equestrian classes for the assets they had voluntarily contributed as a war effort six years prior. They could afford this because the war had been tilting in their favor for some time: the Carthaginians had lost Hispania, Hasdrubal’s expedition had ended poorly, and Scipio Africanus was already in Africa, in an operation aimed at forcing Hannibal to leave Italy.

In fact, Carthage, under the authority of Hanno the Great, anticipated the catastrophe and denied reinforcements, while sending an embassy to Rome in 203 BCE to negotiate an armistice. They argued that the hostilities were the doing of the Barcas, acting on their own without the support of the suffetes (Punic senators). Levinus, like Scipio, advised rejecting the proposal, suggesting they might be spies, and the Senate did not even receive the delegates, so the war would continue for another couple of years until 201 BCE.

The kingdom of Pergamon and other Greek states around 200 BC.
The Kingdom of Macedonia on the eve of the Second Macedonian War. Credit: Marsyas / Willyboy / Wikimedia Commons

The final victory over the Carthaginians did not mean peace for the Romans, who were forced to defend by arms the foundations of what would soon be an empire. With their hands freed, the objective now was to aid their Asian allies against the Macedonia of Philip V. Given his experience in the region, Levinus was appointed propraetor once again and set sail for the eastern Mediterranean with a fleet of thirty-eight ships, landing in northern Greece and advancing overland. In his reports, he assured that the Macedonians were preparing to attack Athens.

In reality, this was a response to Athens’s declaration of war, as all the Greeks were aware that the Romans would seek a pretext to intervene in their aid. Nevertheless, the Senate remained reluctant to declare war and merely warned Philip, demanding the withdrawal of his troops. The monarch rejected the ultimatum, considering that he was not violating the Treaty of Phoenice (which had ended the First Macedonian War), and even laid siege to Abydos in Egypt. The Romans sent a second warning, urging Philip to arbitrate with Pergamon and Rhodes, but they also mobilized their troops.

It was already the spring of 200 BCE, the season Rome had been waiting for to intervene, following the propraetor’s recommendation, backed by the consuls, thus starting the Second Macedonian War. But Levinus would not have the chance to participate; there would be no more military adventures for him, as he died that same year. Titus Livy recounts that his sons, Publius and Marcus, honored his memory by organizing funeral games with gladiator fights in the Forum that lasted four days.

This article was first published on our Spanish Edition on October 28, 2024: Marco Valerio Levino, el general romano que consiguió que los senadores entregaran al tesoro público sus bienes para financiar la guerra contra Aníbal

SOURCES

Tito Livio, Historia de Roma desde su fundación

Polibio, Historias

Plutarco, Vidas paralelas: Marcelo

Sergei I. Kovaliov, Historia de Roma

Wikipedia, Marco Valerio Levino

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