A recent study published in the Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies reveals interesting details about the system of public contracts in the Roman Republic, highlighting the delicate interaction between state power and private interests in managing the public affairs of ancient Rome.
The research, conducted by Anna Tarwacka of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, examines in depth the so-called locationes censoriae, public contracts managed by Roman censors for carrying out public works and collecting taxes. These agreements, which were at the very heart of the Roman state’s functioning, reveal a complex web of relationships between magistrates, the Senate, private contractors, and the Roman people.
According to the study, the censors, magistrates elected every five years, played a crucial role in awarding and supervising these contracts. They had the authority to determine the terms of the agreements, as well as to enter into and execute them on behalf of the Roman people. This practice, which seemingly dates back to the early days of the censorial magistracy, was essential to Rome’s urban and economic development.
The research highlights the variety of projects carried out through these contracts, from the construction and repair of public buildings to the collection of taxes for the use of navigable rivers, ports, gardens, mines, and public lands. The scale of these enterprises was such that, according to the Greek historian Polybius, a large part of Roman society was involved, whether as contractors, partners, or guarantors.
A particularly interesting aspect revealed by the study is the rise of the societates publicanorum, companies of publicans formed by members of the equestrian order. These collective entities were better equipped to handle the burden of fulfilling the contracts than individual citizens, leading to the accumulation of wealth and political power by the equites. However, this system also had its downsides, such as exploitative policies in the provinces that greatly impoverished these regions during the Republic’s decline.
The article delves into the different types of contracts the censors could enter into, including the sarta tecta tuenda locare for the maintenance and repair of public buildings, opera publica for all types of public works, and vectigalia locare for tax collection. The author notes that there is some academic debate about the exact interpretation of some of these terms, such as ultro tributa, which could refer either to funds allocated to the censors for public expenses or to works that contractors committed to performing at the lowest possible price.
A fascinating aspect of the contracting process was the public auction, which took place in the presence of the Roman people. A herald (praeco) conducted the auction until the price was set, either the highest (in the case of vectigalia) or the lowest (for ultro tributa). The successful bidder had to provide a personal and material guarantee (predibus prediisque) to ensure the contract’s fulfillment.
The research also provides information on the protection of contractors in this system. While traditionally more attention has been paid to the consequences for contractors who failed to meet their obligations, the study suggests that there were indirect mechanisms of protection for contractors. These could include the possibility of protesting by invoking the terms of the contract if an official imposed overly strict requirements or the opportunity to appeal to influential figures for assistance.
Of particular significance was the central role the Senate played in overseeing these contracts. According to Polybius, the Senate had supreme authority over all matters related to public contracts. It could grant extensions, ease contract terms in case of an accident, or even release the contractor entirely if the contract proved impossible to fulfill.
The study cites several historical examples that illustrate this dynamic. In one case, the Senate ordered a re-auctioning of contracts after the publicans complained about the excessively high prices set by censors Cato and Flaccus. In another incident, publicans, dissatisfied with their exclusion from a particular auction by the censors, first sought the Senate’s help and, failing that, turned to a tribune of the plebs.
These examples highlight the complex network of interests and powers surrounding the locationes censoriae. Although the censors were vested with broad powers, they did not operate in a political vacuum. The Senate, the tribunes of the plebs, and even the Roman people could influence the public contracting process, creating a system of checks and balances that, while imperfect, sought to reconcile the interests of the state with those of private contractors.
The research offers valuable insights into the interaction between the state and private interests in antiquity. At a time when debates about public contracting and economic regulation remain relevant, this historical study provides a fascinating point of comparison, revealing both the similarities and differences between ancient and modern practices.
The study underscores the sophistication and complexity of the Roman administrative system, challenging simplistic notions about governance in the ancient world. The locationes censoriae emerge as an intricate mechanism that not only facilitated the execution of public works and tax collection but also served as a field of negotiation between different political and economic actors in the Roman Republic.
SOURCES
Tarwacka, A. (2024). Between coercion and protection. Locationes censoriae in the times of the Roman Republic. Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies, 65(1), 3-17. doi.org/10.1556/2052.2024.00529
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